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Abstract:  
This paper studies the effects of fiscal policies on external and budget deficits. From 
a tractable small open-economy, overlapping-generation model, the effects are 
measured by the responses of the external deficit to an increase in the budget deficit 
due to a tax-cut. The responses are positively affected by the birth rate and the 
degree of persistence of the budget deficit. Empirical results for the G7 countries over 
the post-1975 period reveal that the values of birth rate are small for all, but one, 
countries ; but the responses of external and budget deficits are substantial and 
persistent for most countries. In particular, the fiscal policy has the most important 
effects on the external deficits for Canada, Japan, and the United States ; somewhat 
smaller impacts for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom ; and negligible 
effects for Italy. 
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1. Introduction
This paper studies the effects of fiscal policies on external and budget deficits.
More precisely, our analysis assesses the implications of reducing taxes. Conceptu-
ally, a tax-cut clearly leads to an increase of the budget deficit, but has ambiguous
effects on the external deficit. For example, this fiscal policy augments the external
deficit, as long as there is an increase of consumption (of imported goods) induced
by the increase of private after-tax incomes. However, the policy does not alter the
external deficit, if private spendings are not affected by changes of means to finance
public expenditures.
This controversy has motivated many empirical investigations. Some of these
studies have estimated the influence of fiscal policies on external and budet deficits
from reduced forms (Bernheim 1987; Roubini 1988; Anderson 1990; Evans 1990).
The other analyses have tested the hypothesis that the means of financing pub-
lic expenditures are neutral, from structural consumption models (Johnson 1986;
Katsaitis 1987; Evans 1988; Leiderman and Razin 1988; Enders and Lee 1990;
Haug 1990; Evans 1993; Evans and Hasan 1994) and current account specifications
(Ahmed 1986, 1987; Hercowitz 1986; Sheffrin and Woo 1990; Otto 1992; Chen and
Haug 1993; Ghosh 1995).
Unfortunately, these studies are plagued by severe problems. In particular,
estimating reduced forms only allows one to verify the significance of the correlations
between variables; it does not reveal the importance of the causal impacts of fiscal
policies on the external deficit. Moreover, refuting the neutrality hypothesis from
structural equations only implies that governments have the ability to affect the
external deficit by changing the timing of taxes; it does not provide information on
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the importance of the effects of such a policy.
Recently, Normandin (1999) improves on earlier work by directly gauging the
causal effects of fiscal policies on external and budget deficits. From a tractable small
open-economy version of Blanchard (1985) overlapping-generation model, these ef-
fects are measured by the responses of the external deficit to an increase in the
budget deficit due to a tax-cut. These responses increase as the birth rate in-
creases. This occurs because a rise of the birth rate implies that the tax burden can
be more easily shifted to future generations, so that current private consumption
and external deficit augment. In addition, the responses increase as the persistence
of the budget deficit increases. This arises because the persistence implies that an
augmentation of the contemporaneous budget deficit signals future rises of this vari-
able, and thus future tax reductions, so that these ‘sunny days’ lead to an increase
of current consumption and external deficit.
This paper extends Normandin (1999) analysis in two crucial dimensions.
First, the analysis is enlarged by studying the G7 countries. As a group, these
countries account for 55 percent of the overall 1990 real gross domestic product of
the 116 countries for which the data are available in the Penn World Tables (Mark
5.6a). This suggests that the inclusion of these countries is important to have
a broad international perspective of the effects of fiscal policies on external and
budget deficits. This constrasts with Normandin (1999) who considers exclusively
Canada and the United States, which account for only 25 percent of the overall
economic activity.
Second, the influences of fiscal policies are evaluated from both impact and
dynamic responses. The impact responses give information on the instantaneous
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effects of a tax-cut. The dynamic responses document the delayed effects of such a
policy. Thus, the joint analysis of impact and dynamic responses offers the consider-
able advantage of providing a complete assessment of the effects of fiscal policies on
external and budget deficits through time. This constrasts with Normandin (1999)
who focuses only on the impact responses.
Our analysis is performed on quarterly series for the G7 countries over the
post-1975 period. Unit root tests reveal that the current account, budget deficit, net
output, and nonhuman wealth are first-order integrated time series for almost all
countries. Furthermore, cointegration tests indicate that there exists a single cointe-
gration relation between the current account, the budget deficit, and the nonhuman
wealth for most countries. It can be shown that these time-series properties provide
empirical supports for the tractable small open-economy, overlapping-generation
model, as long as the birth rate is strictly positive.
Combining the model with the notion of agents’ superior information (rela-
tive to the econometrician) allows one to derive testable orthogonality restrictions.
Furthermore, these restrictions are exploited to estimate the birth rate. Interest-
ingly, the estimates confirm that the birth rate is always strictly positive. This
implies that the neutrality hypothesis is rejected, so that fiscal policies alter the
external deficit. Yet, the estimates reveal that the birth rate is numerically small.
For example, the values of birth rate can be as low as 0.1 percent (per quarter)
for all, but one, countries. This suggests that a tax-cut as only negligible effects
on external deficit, unless the budget deficit exhibits a great degree of persistence.
This is because the impact and dynamic responses of external deficit correspond to
the value of the birth rate, in the absence of persistence.
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Finally, combining the model with agents’ superior information enables one
to derive restricted vectors autoregressions. These processes capture the persis-
tence of budget deficit, and are evaluated at the relevant values of birth rate to
estimate the impact and dynamic responses of external and budget deficits fol-
lowing a tax-cut. Interestingly, these responses reveal that the budget deficit is
persistently affected by the fiscal policy for all countries. Moreover, the responses
indicate that the external deficit substantially and persistently increases for most
countries. In particular, these responses often exceed the values of birth rate, to
reach 1.36 currency units (e.g. dollars) at impact and 1.08 currency units after 20
quarters following a one-unit-currency tax-cut. Overall, the fiscal policy has the
most important effects on the external deficits for Canada, Japan, and the United
States; somewhat smaller impacts for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom;
and negligible effects for Italy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical eco-
nomic environment. Section 3 constructs and describes the data. Section 4 esti-
mates the birth rate. Section 5 estimates the effects of fiscal policies on external
and budget deficits. Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Economic Environment
Blanchard (1985) overlapping generations model is amended to obtain a
tractable small open economic environment. For this purpose, the behavior of
individual and aggregate consumptions, the financing of government expenditures,
as well as the determination of the current account and external deficit are derived.
In contrast to Normandin (1999), the environment is completely described and fully
solved.
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2.1 Individual Consumption
In period t, each domestic consumer born at time s solves the following
problem:
max
{Cs,t+j}
−1
2
Et
∞∑
j=0
(Cs,t+j − βs)2(1 + r)−j(1− p)j , (1)
s.t. (Bs,t+1 + Fs,t+1) = (1 + η)(Bs,t + Fs,t +Ws,t − Ts,t − Cs,t). (2)
Et represents the expectation operator conditional on information available in pre-
riod t, Cs,t is consumption, Ws,t is a noninsurable stochastic labor income, Ts,t is
lump-sum taxes, Bs,t is the purchases of one period bonds issued by the domestic
government, and Fs,t is the purchases of foreign one period bonds.
Also, the term (1 + η) represents the gross return on individual nonhuman
wealth. To interpret this return, it is convenient to postulate the existence of
insurance firms which make (receive) every period an annuity payment to (from)
each consumer holding positive (negative) nonhuman wealth and inherit this wealth
at consumer’s death. Under the assumption that these firms face a zero-profit
condition, Yaari (1965) shows that (1+η) = (1+r)/(1−p). Here, (1+r) corresponds
to the gross return on one period bonds, while (1− p)−1 is the gross annuity rate.
In addition, βs is a bliss point, (1− p) is the probability of being alive next
period, and p is the birth rate. When p = 0, the domestic economy is described
by an infinitely-lived representative consumer model. When p = 1, the domestic
environment is represented by a sequence of static economies, i.e. each cohort is
fully replaced in the subsequent period by a different cohort. The parameter p can
also be interpreted as a measure of the imperfectness of intergenerational linkages.
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More precisely, domestic consumers are altruistic only when p is smaller than the
actual domestic birth rate.
Equation (1) describes the preferences of the domestic consumer. These pref-
erences are characterized by a quadratic period utility function. This specification
allows one to simplify the exposition. Equation (2) corresponds to the budget con-
straint. This constraint involves a constant gross return. Again, this permits one to
simplify the presentation. The consumer maximizes its utility subject to its budget
constraint by choosing a path of expected consumption. The optimal path is given
by the Euler equation:
EtCs,t+j = Cs,t. (3)
This expression stipulates that the temporal trajectory of expected consumption is
flat, i.e. consumption is a martingale. Also, the Euler equation (3) and the budget
constraint (2) yield the individual consumption function:
Cs,t =
η
1 + η
[
(Bs,t + Fs,t) +Et
∞∑
j=0
(Ws,t+j − Ts,t+j)(1 + η)−j
]
. (4)
The function (4) is static for a sequence of static economies [p = 1, so that (1+η)→
∞]. In contrast, (4) is dynamic when there is an infinitely-lived representative
consumer [p = 0, so that (1 + η) = (1 + r)].
2.2 Aggregate Consumption
An aggregate variable is defined as Xt =
∑t
s=−∞ Ps,tXs,t. Here, Ps,t =
p(1 − p)(t−s) is the size in period t of the cohort born at time s, p is the number
of individuals born each period (i.e. Ps,s = p), and P = 1 is the (normalized) total
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population. Following Gali (1990), the aggregation is performed by postulating
that individual labor income and taxes are the same for all consumers. That is,
Ws,t+j = Wt+j and Ts,t+j = Tt+j , so that the aggregate labor income and taxes
are Wt+j =
∑t
s=−∞ Ps,tWs,t+j and Tt+j =
∑t
s=−∞ Ps,tTs,t+j. As in Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995, section 3), it is further assumed that domestic firms do not face
capital installation costs and satisfy a zero-profit condition. In this case, aggregate
labor income corresponds to the difference between aggregate output and aggregate
investment expenditures; that is, Wt = (Yt − It).
Using these notions and the individual consumption function (4) yields the
following aggregate consumption function:
Ct =
t∑
s=−∞
Ps,tCs,t,
=
η
1 + η
t∑
s=−∞
Ps,t
[
(Bs,t + Fs,t) + Et
∞∑
j=0
(Ws,t+j − Ts,t+j)(1 + η)−j
]
,
=
η
1 + η
[
(Bt + Ft) + Et
∞∑
j=0
(Wt+j − Tt+j)(1 + η)−j
]
,
=
η
1 + η
[
(Bt + Ft) + Et
∞∑
j=0
(Yt+j − It+j − Tt+j)(1 + η)−j
]
, (5)
where Ct is the aggregate consumption and (Bt + Ft) is the aggregate nonhuman
wealth. The function (5) is static when p = 1 [i.e. (1+ η)→∞] and dynamic when
p = 0 [i.e. (1 + η) = (1 + r)].
Moreover, using the notion that each consumer has zero nonhuman wealth
at birth [i.e. (Bt+1,t+1 + Ft+1,t+1) = 0] and the individual budget constraint (2)
yields the following aggregate intertemporal budget constraint:
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(Bt+1 + Ft+1) =
t+1∑
s=−∞
Ps,t+1(Bs,t+1 + Fs,t+1),
= (1− p)
t∑
s=−∞
Ps,t(Bs,t+1 + Fs,t+1),
= (1− p)(1 + η)
t∑
s=−∞
Ps,t(Bs,t + Fs,t +Ws,t − Ts,t − Cs,t),
= (1 + r)(Bt + Ft +Wt − Tt − Ct),
= (1 + r)(Bt + Ft + Yt − It − Tt − Ct). (6)
Equation (6) reflects the idea that, in aggregate, the gross return on nonhuman
wealth is (1+r), rather than (1+η). This is because the annuity payments represent
pure transfers among consumers.
2.3 Financing of Government Expenditures
The public sector of the domestic country faces the following intertemporal
budget constraint:
(Bt+1 + B∗t+1) = (1 + r)(Bt + B∗t +Gt − Tt), (7)
= (Bt +B∗t ) + (1 + r)Dt. (8)
The variable B∗t is the value of foreign purchases of one period domestic bonds, Gt
represents the domestic government stochastic expenditures on goods and services,
and Dt = r1+r (Bt+B
∗
t )+Gt−Tt corresponds to the definition of the budget deficit
(which includes the service of the debt).
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In this context, future aggregate taxes are obtained by applying recursive
substitutions on (8):
Tt+j =
r
1 + r (Bt+j + B
∗
t+j) +Gt+j −Dt+j ,
=
r
1 + r
[
(Bt + B∗t ) + (1 + r)
j−1∑
k=0
Dt+k
]
+Gt+j −Dt+j , (9)
where j ≥ 1. Furthermore, the present value of aggregate taxes is given by:
∞∑
j=0
Tt+j(1 + η)j =
r
1 + r (Bt + B
∗
t )
∞∑
j=0
(1 + η)−j
+
∞∑
j=0
(Gt+j −Dt+j)(1 + η)−j + r
∞∑
j=1
(1 + η)−j
j−1∑
k=0
Dt+k,
=
( r
1 + r
)(1 + η
η
)
(Bt +B∗t ) +
∞∑
j=0
(Gt+j −Dt+j)(1 + η)−j + r
∞∑
j=0
Dt+j
∞∑
k=j+1
(1 + η)−k,
=
( r
1 + r
)(1 + η
η
)
(Bt +B∗t ) +
∞∑
j=0
(
Gt+j +
(r − η
η
)
Dt+j
)
(1 + η)−j . (10)
Substituting expression (10) in (5) allows one to rewrite the aggregate con-
sumption function as:
Ct =
η
1 + η (Bt + Ft)−
r
1 + r (Bt +B
∗
t ) +
η
1 + ηEt
∞∑
j=0
(
Qt+j +
(η − r
η
)
Dt+j
)
(1 + η)−j ,
=
[
η
1 + η (Bt + Ft)−
r
1 + r (Bt +B
∗
t )
]
+
[
Qt +
(η − r
η
)
Dt
]
−
[
−Et
∞∑
j=1
(
∆Qt+j +
(η − r
η
)
∆Dt+j
)
(1 + η)−j
]
, (11)
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where ∆ is the first difference operator, Dt+j =
(∑j
k=1∆Dt+k + Dt
)
, Qt+j =
(∑j
k=1∆Qt+k + Qt
)
, Qt = (Yt − It − Gt) is the aggregate net output, and [Qt +
((η − r)/η)Dt] is the aggregate cash flow. The function (11) states that aggregate
consumption is equal to the sum of the aggregate nonhuman income (the first set
of brackets) and aggregate cash flow (the second set of brackets), minus the aggre-
gate saving (the third set of brackets). Here, the aggregate saving corresponds to
expected future declines in aggregate cash flows. In addition, the measure of cash
flow involves the term ((η−r)/η), which is the probability that consumers currently
alive will not have to pay the future increases in taxes required to reimburse the
contemporanous budget deficit. As before, the function (11) is static for a sequence
of static economies [p = 0, so that (1 + η) → ∞]. In addition, the tax burden is
completely shifted to future generations [i.e. ((η − r)/η)→ 1]. In contrast, (11) is
dynamic when there is an infinitely-lived representative consumer [p = 0, so that
(1+ η) = (1+ r)]. In this case, the consumer reimburses entirely the budget deficit
[i.e. ((η − r)/η) = 0].
Finally, substituting expression (9) in (6) permits one to rewrite the aggre-
gate intertemporal budget constraint as:
(Bt+1 + Ft+1) = (1 + r)(Bt + Ft +Qt +Dt − Ct)− r(Bt + B∗t ). (12)
2.4 Current Account and External Deficit
The external deficit is measured as the negative of the current account. For
the domestic economy just described, the current account is defined as:
10
Zt = [(Ft+1 − Ft)− (B∗t+1 −B∗t )]/(1 + r). (13)
Equation (13) corresponds to changes in net foreign asset positions. Also, substi-
tuting the aggregate intertemporal budget constraints (6) and (7) in (13) enables
one to rewrite the current account as:
Zt =
r
1 + r (Ft −B
∗
t ) +Qt − Ct, (14)
where r1+r (Ft−B
∗
t ) is the net income on foreign assets. Expression (14) corresponds
to the portion of national ressources that is not absorbed by domestic agents.
Moreover, substituting the aggregate consumption function (11) in (14) and
(12) yields:
Zt = −
p
1 + r (Bt + Ft)−
(η − r
η
)
Dt
−
[
Et
∞∑
j=1
(
∆Qt+j +
(η − r
η
)
∆Dt+j
)
(1 + η)−j
]
, (15)
and
(Bt+1 + Ft+1) = (1− p)(Bt + Ft) + (1 + r)
(
1−
(η − r
η
))
Dt
− (1 + r)
[
Et
∞∑
j=1
(
∆Qt+j +
(η − r
η
)
∆Dt+j
)
(1 + η)−j
]
. (16)
Expressions (15) and (16) are the rules for the current account and nonhuman
wealth. Again, these rules are static for a sequence of static economies [p = 1,
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so that ((η − r)/η) → 1 and (1 + η) → ∞]. In this case, a one-currency-unit
(e.g. one-dollar) tax-cut does not alter future nonhuman wealth, but implies a one-
currency-unit decrease in the contemporanous current account. Consequently, this
fiscal policy affects both the external and budget deficits. In contrast, the rules are
dynamic when there is an infinitely-lived representative consumer [p = 0, so that
((η − r)/η) = 0 and (1 + η) = (1 + r)]. In addition, a one-currency-unit tax-cut
leads to a (1 + r)-currency-unit increase in future nonhuman wealth, but does not
alter the current account. Thus, the fiscal policy only affects the budget deficit.
Finally, the rules (15) and (16) are rearranged as:
Zˆt ≡ Zt +
p
1 + r (Ft +Bt) +
(η − r
η
)
Dt, (17)
= −Et
∞∑
j=1
(
∆Qt+j +
(η − r
η
)
∆Dt+j
)
(1 + η)−j , (18)
and
( ̂Bt+1 + Ft+1) ≡ (Bt+1 + Ft+1)− (1− p)(Bt + Ft)− (1 + r)
(
1−
(η − r
η
))
Dt,(19)
= −(1 + r)Et
∞∑
j=1
(
∆Qt+j +
(η − r
η
)
∆Dt+j
)
(1 + η)−j . (20)
Equations (17) and (19) define the adjusted current account, Zˆt, and the adjusted
aggregate nonhuman wealth, ( ̂Bt+1 + Ft+1). Expressions (18) and (20) are the
rules for the adjusted variables. When p < 1, these rules are purely forward-looking
since the adjusted variables are exclusively related to expected changes in future
stochastic forcing variables. When p = 0, the single forcing variable corresponds to
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the aggregate net output. When 0 < p < 1, the forcing variables also include the
budget deficit. Equations (17) and (18) will be central to our analysis of the effects
of fiscal policies on external and budget deficits.
3. Data
The quarterly seasonally adjusted measures are constructed for the G7 coun-
tries over the post-1975 period. As a group, these countries account for 55 percent
of the overall 1990 real gross domestic product of the 116 countries for which the
data are available in the Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6a). In contrast, Normandin
(1999) considers exclusively Canada and the United States to account for only 25
percent of the overall economic activity.
3.1 Construction of the Data
The individual countries (samples) are Canada (1975-I to 2001-III), France
(1975-I to 1998-IV), Germany (1975-I to 1998-IV), Italy (1975-I to 1998-IV), Japan
(1977-I to 2001-III), the United Kingdom (1975-I to 1999-IV), and the United States
(1975-I to 2001-III). Germany refers to West Germany and Unified Germany for
the pre- and post-1990 periods. The measures are mainly computed from the In-
ternational Financial Statistics (IFS) released by the International Monetary Funds
(IMF), as well as the Main Economic Indicators (MEI) and the Quarterly National
Accounts (QNA) published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).
Current Account and External Deficit
For each country, the current account (Zt) is constructed as the product
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of the nominal current account in US dollars (source: IFS, IMF) and the nominal
exchange rate of national currency units per US dollars (source: IFS, IMF), deflated
by the all-item consumer price index (CPI) for the baseyear 1995 (source: MEI,
OECD). For each country, the published series of current account are not seasonally
adjusted. Thus, the current account is regressed (by OLS) on quarter dummies to
remove seasonality. The external deficit is measured as the negative of the current
account.
Budget Deficit
With the exception of Japan, the budget deficit (Dt) corresponds to the nom-
inal budget deficit in national currency (source: IFS, IMF), normalized by the CPI.
Because these data are not seasonally adjusted, the series are regressed on quar-
ter dummies. For Japan, the budget deficit is the sum of the nominal government
final consumption expenditures in national currency (source: QNA, OECD) and
the nominal debt service in national currency (source: Japan Statistical Yearbook
2002) less the nominal total tax revenues in national currency (source: Revenue
Statistics, OEDC), divided by the CPI. The published data on total tax revenues
are annual. For this reason, this series is interpolated by using the Quadratic-Match
Average Nonparametric Method available in Eviews.
Net Output
For each country, the net output (Qt) is the difference between the nominal
gross domestic product in national currency (source: QNA, OECD) and the sum
of the nominal gross fixed capital formation in national currency (source: QNA,
OECD) and the nominal government final consumption expenditures in national
currency (source: QNA, OECD), divided by the CPI. The published data for Ger-
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many are not seasonally adjusted. Hence, the German series are regressed on quarter
dummies.
Nonhuman Wealth
For each country, the nonhuman wealth (Bt + Ft) is constructed as the
weighted sum of the debt service and the net income on foreign assets. The weight
corresponds to
(1+r
r
)
, with the calibration r = 0.01 (per quarter). For each country,
the net income on foreign assets
[ r
1+r (Ft − B
∗
t )
]
is the nominal factor income in
national currency (source: Time Series Query, World Bank), deflated by the CPI.
Because the data on net factor income are annual, this series is interpolated by using
the Quadratic-Match Average algorithm. For Japan, the debt service
[ r
1+r (Bt +
B∗t )
]
is the nominal debt service in national currency (source: Japan Statistical
Yearbook 2002), normalized by the CPI. For the other countries, the debt service is
the sum of the nominal budget deficit in national currency (source: IFS, IMF) and
the nominal total tax revenues in national currency (source: Revenue Statistics,
OEDC) less the nominal government final consumption expenditures in national
currency (source: QNA, OECD), divided by the CPI. Again, the series on total tax
revenues are interpolated and the data on budget deficit are deseasonalized.
3.2 Description of the Data
Figure 1 displays the time series of current account, budget deficit, net out-
put, and nonhuman wealth for each country. Visual inspection suggests that the
current accounts and budget deficits exhibit volatilities which increase through time
for most countries. Also, the net outputs and nonhuman wealth feature levels that
increase through time for most countries. Overall, these characteristics suggest that
15
the series are first-order integrated.
Consequently, the tests developped by Dickey and Fuller (1979) [DF] and
Phillips and Perron (1988) [PP] are performed to verify the presence of unit roots.
In their basic form, these tests rely on a regression of the contemporaneous change
of a series on the lagged level of this series. The null hypothesis of unit root cannot
be rejected if the t-statistic indicates that the coefficient of the regression is not
significantly different from zero. In practice, the regression is enriched by following
the procedure outlined by Campbell and Perron (1991). For the DF and PP tests,
a constant and a linear trend are also included in the regression if the associated
estimates are individually significant at the 10 percent level. For the DF test, lagged
changes of the series are further incorporated in the regression, where the relevant
number (up to 15) of lags is selected by the Akaike information criterion. For the
PP test, a triangular Bartlett window with a truncation parameter corresponding
to the integer part of
[
4×
( T
100
)2/9] (where T is the sample size) is used to obtain a
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix of the regression
estimates (Newey and West 1987).
Table 1 reports the DF and PP tests for the levels of current account, budget
deficit, net output, and nonhuman wealth. Interestingly, the DF and PP tests
almost always include the same sets of deterministic components. Also, both the
DF and PP tests cannot reject the unit root hypothesis for 19 out of the 28 cases.
In addition, either the DF or PP test cannot reject the null hypothesis for four
series. Finally, both the DF and PP tests reject the presence of unit root for only
five cases. These exceptions are the budget deficits for Germany and the United
Kingdom, the net output for Italy, and the nonhuman wealth for Japan and the
United Kingdom. Overall, these findings indicate that the unit root hypothesis is
16
reasonable for almost all series.
Table 2 presents the DF and PP tests for the changes of current account,
budget deficit, net output, and nonhuman wealth. Again, the DF and PP tests
incorporate the same deterministic terms for most of the cases. Moreover, both the
DF and PP tests strongly reject the unit root hypothesis for 27 out of the 28 cases.
The exception is that the DF test detects a unit root in the change of nonhuman
wealth for Canada, while the PP test does not. In sum, these results confirm that
the levels of current account, budget deficit, net output, and nonhuman wealth are
generally first-order integrated, so that the changes of these series are stationary.
For completeness, the tests developped by Johansen (1991) are performed
to verify the presence of cointegration relations between the levels of the series. In
their basic form, these tests rely on a vector error correction model (VECM), where
a vector containing the contemporaneous changes of the series is related to a vector
including the lagged levels of the series. The appropriate number of cointegration
relations is detected from statistics related to the trace [Tr] and the maximum
eigenvalue [ME] of the coefficient matrix affecting the vector of the lagged levels of
the series. In practice, the VECM is enriched by incorporating a vector of constants
and vectors of lagged changes of the series. The relevant number (up to 15) of lags
is determined by the Akaike information criterion.
Table 3 reports the Tr and ME tests for the cointegration relations between
the levels of current account, budget deficit, and nonhuman wealth. Empirically,
both the Tr and ME tests reject the no cointegration hypothesis for five out of the
seven countries. In addition, either the Tr or ME test reject the null hypothesis for
the other two cases. Finally, the Tr or ME test cannot reject the notion that there
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is a single cointegration relation for five countries. The exceptions are the United
Kingdom with zero or two cointegration relations, and the United States with three
cointegration relations. Overall, these findings indicate that the assumption of a
single cointegration relation is reasonable for almost all countries.
To summarize, the test results reveal that the current account, budget deficit,
net output, and nonhuman wealth are first-order integrated for almost all countries.
Furthermore, there exists only one cointegration relation between the current ac-
count, the budget deficit, and the nonhuman wealth for most cases. Interestingly,
these results provide an empirical support for our tractable theoretical economic
environment, as long as the birth rate is strictly positive. Specifically, the environ-
ment predicts that the adjusted current account must be stationary. This is because
equation (18) states that Zˆt is a linear combination of ∆Qt and ∆Dt, where these
changes are always stationary. Moreover, equation (17) implies that Zˆt = Zt when
p = 0, such that the current account should be stationary. However, this property
never holds in the data, and as such it refutes the case of a null birth rate. Finally,
equation (17) states that Zˆt =
[
Zt + p1+r (Ft +Bt) +
(
η−r
η
)
Dt
]
when p > 0, which
implies that their is a single cointegration relation between the current account, the
budget deficit, and the nonhuman wealth. This property almost always holds in the
data, so that it accords with a strictly positive birth rate.
4. Estimation of the Birth Rate
The birth rate is a key ingredient involved in the defintion (17) and the rule
(18) of adjusted current account, which are central to the evaluation of the effects
of fiscal policies on external and budget deficits. Here, two estimation methods
for the birth rate are elaborated and applied. Both procedures exploit certain
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orthogonality restrictions. These restrictions can be derived when agents possess a
richer information set than the econometrician. In contrast to Normandin (1999),
the agents’ superior information is fully detailed.
4.1 Agents’ Superior Information
It is most plausible that agents’ decisions rely on more information than just
the history of forcing variables. In this spirit, the law of motion for forcing variables
is specified as:


∆Qt
∆Dt
∆Ht

 =


pi11 pi12 pi13
pi21 pi22 pi23
pi31 pi32 pi33




∆Qt−1
∆Dt−1
∆Ht−1

+


νq,t
νd,t
νh,t

 ,
or more compactly
Wt = ΠwWt−1 + Vt. (21)
This law of motion assumes that the appropriate forcing variables are the net output
and budget deficit. This is predicted by our theoretical economic environment when
the birth rate is positive (see section 2). This is also consistent with the empirical
time-series properties (see section 3).
The law of motion stipulates that the information set incorporates, not only
past values of forcing variables, but also lagged values of a hidden variable Ht.
This variable can be viewed as a composite of several exogenous variables. In ad-
dition, the hidden variable contains relevant extra information to improve forecasts
of future forcing variables when it Granger-causes changes of net output or of bud-
get deficit (pi13 6= 0 or pi23 6= 0). Finally, it is assumed that the hidden variable
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is observed and used by the economic agents, but is unknown or omitted by the
econometrician. This implies that the agents’ information set is superior to the
econometrician’s one.
In practice, the presence of the hidden variable makes it difficult to estimate
the law of motion (21). Following Boileau and Normandin (2002, 2003), it is pos-
sible to use the rule (18) and the law of motion (21) to extract a law of motion
that contains only variables that are observed by the econometrician. This occurs
because the rule implies that agents fully reveal their expectations of future forcing
variables through there forwarg-looking decisions. Then, an adequate law of motion
is obtained by replacing the hidden variable by the adjusted current account. This
yields a law of motion that is augmented by agents’ superior information.
To derive the augmented law of motion, first the agents’ expectations con-
structed from (21) are substituted in the rule (18) to yield:
Zˆt = ϕzwWt, (22)
where ϕzw = −
[
e′1+
(η−r
η
)
e′2
]
Πw(1+η)−1
[
I−Πw(1+η)−1
]
, I is the identity matrix,
e1 = (1 0 0 )′, e2 = (0 1 0 )′, and e3 = ( 0 0 1 )′. Second, the expression
(22) is rewritten as:
Xz,t = ΥzWt, (23)
where Xz,t = (∆Qt ∆Dt Zˆt )′ and Υz = ( e′1 e′2 ϕzw )
′. Third, substituting
(21) in (23) permits one to obtain a vector autoregression (VAR) for the adjusted
current account:
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

∆Qt
∆Dt
Zˆt

 =


γ11 γ12 γ13
γ21 γ22 γ23
γ31 γ32 γ33




∆Qt−1
∆Dt−1
Zˆt−1

+


uq,t
ud,t
uz,t

 ,
or
Xz,t = ΓzXz,t−1 + Uz,t, (24)
where Γz = ΥzΠwΥ−1z and Uz,t = ΥzVt.
Note that the first two equations of (24) form the law of motion for forc-
ing variables augmented by the adjusted current account. In this augmented law
of motion, the feedbacks from lagged adjusted current account to contemporanous
forcing variables reflect the effects of the lagged hidden variable on current forcing
variables: γ13 6= 0 and γ23 6= 0 only if pi13 6= 0 and pi23 6= 0. This means that the ex-
istence of agents’ superior information can be verified by applying Granger-causality
tests on (24), since it exclusively contains variables that are in the econometrician’s
information set. Also, note that the last equation of (24) states that the innovation
of adjusted current account is a function of the innovations of forcing and hidden
variables: uz,t = ϕzwVt. This formulation is in accord with the notion that the
adjusted current account completely captures the relevant information.
Given that the augmented law of motion contains all the relevant informa-
tion, it is useful to estimate the unrestricted version of the VAR (24). In particular,
this process allows one to derive a restricted VAR that involves the testable re-
strictions imposed by our theoretical economic environment. To do so, first the
expectations constructed from the unrestricted VAR (24) are substituted in the
rule (18) to yield:
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Zˆmt = ΘzxXz,t, (25)
where Θzx = −
[
e′1 +
(η−r
η
)
e′2
]
Γz(1 + η)−1
[
I − Γz(1 + η)−1
]−1 is evaluated from
the estimates of Γz and calibrated values of the birth rate p and the return r. The
superscript m indicates that these variables are predicted by the model. Second,
the expression (25) is rewritten as:
Xmz,t = ΘzXz,t, (26)
where Xmz,t = (∆Qt ∆Dt Zˆmt )
′ and Θz = ( e′1 e′2 Θzx )
′. Third, substituting
(24) in (26) produces the restricted VAR for adjusted current account:


∆Qt
∆Dt
Zˆmt

 =


φ11 φ12 φ13
φ21 φ22 φ23
φ31 φ32 φ33




∆Qt−1
∆Dt−1
Zˆmt−1

+


uq,t
ud,t
umz,t

 ,
or
Xmz,t = ΦzXmz,t−1 + Umz,t, (27)
where Φz = ΘzΓzΘ−1z and Umz,t = ΘzUz,t.
For completeness, note that a similar procedure can be applied to obtain the
restricted VAR for adjusted nonhuman wealth:
Xm(b+f),t = Φ(b+f)X
m
(b+f),t−1 + U
m
(b+f),t, (28)
where Xm(b+f),t =
(
∆Qt ∆Dt ( ̂Bt+1 + Ft+1)m
)′, Φ(b+f) = Θ(b+f)Γ(b+f)Θ−1(b+f),
Um(b+f),t = Θ(b+f)U(b+f),t, Γ(b+f) and U(b+f),t are the coefficient matrix and the
22
innovations of the unrestricted VAR, Θ(b+f) = ( e′1 e′2 Θ(b+f),x )
′, and Θ(b+f),x =
−(1 + r)
[
e′1 +
(η−r
η
)
e′2
]
Γ(b+f)(1 + η)−1
[
I − Γ(b+f)(1 + η)−1
]−1.
4.2 Orthogonality Restrictions
Under the null hypothesis that the actual and predicted adjusted current
accounts are identical:
Zˆt = Zˆmt , (29)
certain orthogonality restrictions can be derived. To see this, first the expression
(29) is rewritten by invoking the defintion Zˆt = e′3Xz,t and equation (25):
e′3 = Θzx,
= −
[
e′1 +
(η − r
η
)
e′2
]
Γz(1 + η)−1
[
I − Γz(1 + η)−1
]−1, (30)
or
e′3
[
I − Γz(1 + η)−1
]
= −
[
e′1 +
(η − r
η
)
e′2
]
Γz(1 + η)−1. (31)
The equation (31) imposes the three following linear restrictions: γ31 = γ11 +
(η−r
η
)
γ21, γ32 = γ12 +
(η−r
η
)
γ22, and γ33 = γ13 +
(η−r
η
)
γ23 + (1 + η).
Second, the variable z,t is constructed as the following linear combination:
z,t = Zˆt − (1 + η)Zˆt−1 −∆Qt −
(η − r
η
)
∆Dt. (32)
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This equation is then rewritten by using the first two equations of the unrestricted
VAR (24) and the linear restrictions (31) to express the current variables Zˆt, ∆Qt,
and ∆Dt in (32) exclusively in terms of innovations:
z,t = uz,t − uq,t −
(η − r
η
)
ud,t. (33)
The expression (33) reveals that the linear restrictions (31) imply that the variable
z,t is orthogonal to the information dated before period t. Thus, the conditions
(31) reflect the orthogonality restrictions.
Formally, the orthogonality restrictions (31) are jointly tested from a χ2(3)
distributed Wald test statistic. In practice, this statistic is easy to compute because
it is numerically identical to the Wald statistic for the test that all the coefficients
associated with the regression of z,t on Zˆt−1, ∆Qt−1, and ∆Dt−1 are jointly in-
significant.
4.3 Estimates of Birth Rate
The orthogonality restrictions (31) are useful to estimate the birth rate. One
set of estimates is obtained by testing the restrictions from the following procedure.
Step 1. The variables z,t and Zˆt are constructed by using equations (32) and (17),
the observations for Zt, Dt, Qt, and (Bt + Ft), as well as the calibration r = 0.01
(per quarter) and a given value of birth rate p.
Step 2. The variable z,t is regressed by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on the lagged
variables Zˆt−1, ∆Qt−1, and ∆Dt−1. Then, the probability value is calculated for
the null hypothesis that the regression estimates are jointly insignificant.
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Step 3. Steps 1 and 2 are performed for several values of birth rate, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
From this procedure, the relevant estimates of birth rate are the values of p
for which the orthogonality restrictions hold. In addition, a second set of estimates
of birth rate is directly obtained by applying the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) for the orthogonality condition between z,t and a constant, ∆Qt−1, and
∆Dt−1, as well as from the calibrated value r = 0.01 (per quarter).
Table 4 reports the GMM estimates, pˆ, as well as the smallest values, p
¯
, and
largest values, p¯, for which the orthogonality conditions are not rejected at the 1,
5, and 10 percent levels of significance. Figure 2 compares the probability values
of the orthogonality test obtained from various values of birth rate to conventional
levels of significance.
Empirically, there exist values of p for which the orthogonality conditions
hold at the 10 percent level for several countries. However, exceptions are France,
Italy, and Japan. Also, some values of p imply that the linear restrictions (31) are
not rejected at the 5 percent level for all countries, except France. Interestingly,
there exist values of p for which the orthogonality restrictions are never refuted at
the 1 percent level, without any exception. For this reason, our analysis relies on
these latter values.
It is worth stressing that the values of p
¯
and p¯ are always larger than zero
and smaller than one. Under the interpretation that p is the birth rate, these
results suggest that none of the selected country can be described by an infinitely-
lived respresentative consumer model, nor by a sequence of static economies where
each cohort is totally replaced in the subsequent period. Also, the values of p
¯
are
systematically smaller than the birth rate, p˜, of 0.00525 per quarter (or 2.1 percent
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per year). Moreover, the values of p¯ are always larger than p˜, except for Italy. Note
that p˜ represents a meaningful benchmark: it corresponds to the birth rate required
to ensure a constant population.
Under the interpretation that p is a measure of the imperfectness of inter-
generational linkages, the findings suggest that some newborns are altruistically
linked to their parents as long as the relevant values of p are p
¯
, since these val-
ues are smaller than p˜. More precisely, the proportion of these newborns is given
by (p˜ − p
¯
)/p˜, which is substantial for all countries: it corresponds to 80.95%. In
contrast, the proportion is only (p˜ − p¯)/p˜ = 4.76% for Italy and 0% for the other
countries, when the relevant values of p are assumed to be p¯.
Note that the GMM estimates of p are numerically larger than zero and
smaller than one. The estimates are not significantly different from zero for all
countries, except for Germany and Japan. This means that most economies can be
statistically described by an infinitely-lived respresentative consumer model. How-
ever, this conclusion is inconsistent with the time-series properties of the current
account (see section 3). For this reason, our analysis assumes that the values of p
are positive. Also, the GMM estimates are always significantly different from unity.
This indicates that none of the country can be characterized by a sequence of static
economies. Moreover, the estimates suggest that the proportions of altruistic new-
borns, (p˜− pˆ)/p˜, are 61.90% for the United Kingdom and the United States, 42.86%
for France, 23.81% for Canada and Italy, and 0% for Germany and Japan.
The GMM estimates are also numerically larger than the values of p
¯
and
smaller than those of p¯ for all countries, except for France. In fact, the estimates
are never significantly different from the values of p
¯
, with the exception of Japan.
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The estimates are significantly different from the values of p¯, except for Germany,
Italy, and Japan. In our analysis, the values of p
¯
, p¯, and pˆ are used to verify the
robustness of the results.
For completeness, Table 4 indicates that the overidentication restrictions
related to the GMM estimates are never rejected, except for France and Japan. This
suggests that the orthogonality restrictions statistically hold for most countries,
such that the actual and predicted adjusted current account are similar. Also,
Table 5 presents the probability values of the test that Zˆt does not Granger-cause
∆Qt and ∆Dt (i.e. γ13 = 0 and γ23 = 0). To perform this test, the series Zˆt
is first constructed from equation (17), the values of p
¯
, p¯, and pˆ, as well as the
calibration r = 0.01 (per quarter). Then, this series is used in the unrestricted
VAR (24), which is estimated by OLS. The test results indicate that there are some
feedback effects from the lagged adjusted current account to the contemporaneous
net ouput for Germany when p = p
¯
; for Japan when p = p¯ and p = pˆ; for the
United Kingdom when p = p
¯
, p = p¯, and p = pˆ; as well as for the United States
when p = pˆ. As explained above, these findings are consistent with the presence
of agents’ superior information. Finally, the Schwarz information creterion reveals
that a first-order unrestricted VAR, as stipulated in (24), is appropriate for almost
all cases. Exceptions are France when p = pˆ and the United States when p = p¯,
where in both cases a third-order VAR seems slightly preferable.
5. Estimation of the Effects of Fiscal Policies
The effects of fiscal policies are now evaluated. For this purpose, the impact
and dynamic responses of external and budget deficits following a one-currency-
unit tax-cut are analyzed. In contrast, Normandin (1999) studies only the impact
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responses.
5.1 Construction of the Responses
The effects of fiscal policies on external and budget deficits are documented
from impact and dynamic responses. Conceptually, these responses are defined as:
Ra,j = −
(∂At+j
∂τ,t
)
=
(∂At+j
∂d,t
)
λ. (34)
Here, Ra,j represents the impact response when j = 0 and dynamic responses if
j > 0, while At is a generic variable. For example, the responses of external and
budget deficits are obtained by using the definitions At = −Zt and At = Dt. Also,
τ,t and d,t correspond to positive shocks of taxes and of budget deficit, whereas λ
is a scale parameter.
Equation (34) captures the responses of the variable At to an unexpected
tax-cut. In addition, expression (34) states that these effects correspond to the
responses of At to a positive shock of the budget deficit. To see this, note that d,t
captures the portion of the innovation of the budget deficit ud,t that is orthogonal
to the innovations of net output uq,t, where the net output is constructed from the
government expenditures on goods and services. This ensures that the responses
(34) represent the effects of an increase of the budget deficit that is exclusively
due to a tax-cut, rather than to an increase of goverment expenditures. Finally,
the parameter λ is chosen to scale to unity the impact response of budget deficit
following a budget deficit shock. This eases the interpretation of (34), since it is
equivalent an experiment where the tax-cut is normalized to one currency unit.
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Conceptually, the effects of fiscal policies are evaluated from our theoretical
economic environment. In particular, these effects are derived by exploiting the
definitions of adjusted current account (17) and nonhuman wealth (19), the rules of
these adjusted variables (18) and (20), and the law of motion for forcing variables
(21). Synonymously, the dynamic responses are constructed from the definitions
(17) and (19), as well as the restricted VARs (27) and (28). Recall that the validity
of the linear combinations involved in these definitions is supported by the results
of unit root and cointegration tests (see section 3). Likewise, the relevance of the
restricted VARs is confirmed by the test results of the orthogonality restrictions (see
section 4). In this sense, assessing the effects of fiscal policies from our theoretical
economic environment constitutes a relevant empirical exercise.
The responses of the levels of current account and nonhuman wealth are
recovered from the definitions (17) and (19):
Rz,j = Rzˆ,j −
p
1 + rR(b+f),j −
η − r
η Rd,j , (35)
and
R(b+f),(j+1) = R̂(b+f),(j+1) + (1− p)R(b+f),j + (1 + r)
(
1−
(η − r
η
))
Rd,j . (36)
The responses of external deficit is simply the negative of Rz,j.
Furthermore, the responses of adjusted current account and nonhuman wealth
are obtained from the restricted VARs (27) and (28):
Rzˆ,j =
[
e′3ΦjzΘzΛze2
]
λ, (37)
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and
R̂(b+f),j+1 =
[
e′3Φ
j
(b+f)Θ(b+f)Λ(b+f)e2
]
λ. (38)
Here, Ωz = E
(
Umz,tUmz,t
′) = ΛzΛ′z and Ω(b+f) = E
(
Um(b+f),tUm(b+f),t
′) = Λ(b+f)Λ′(b+f),
where Λz and Λ(b+f) are lower triangular matrices with positive elements on their
diagonals. These Cholesky decompositions yield orthogonalized shocks.
Finally, the responses of the level of budget deficit is derived from the re-
stricted VAR (27):
Rd,j =
j∑
κ=0
[
e′2ΦκzΘzΛze2
]
λ. (39)
Expression (39) exploits the notion that the responses of the level of budget deficit
corresponds to the accumulation of the responses of the changes of this variable,
since Dt+j =
∑j
κ=0∆Dt+κ +Dt−1 and Dt−1 is not affected by shocks occuring in
period t.
The properties of the responses of external deficit are highlighted by per-
forming the following simulation.
Step 1. The law of motion (21) is specified as:
Πw =


pi11 0 pi13
0 pi11 pi13
0 0 pi11

 , (40)
and
Ωw = E
(
VtV ′t
)
= I. (41)
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The parameter pi11 corresponds to the eigenvalues, and thus, captures the degree
of persistence of the forcing and hidden variables. Also, pi13 reflects the degree of
additional information used by agents.
Step 2. The restricted VARs for adjusted current account (27) and for adjusted
nonhuman wealth (28) are constructed from the specification (40) and (41), for a
given calibration of the parameters pi11 and pi13, as well as of the birth rate p and
the return r = 0.01.
Step 3. The simulated impact and dynamic responses of external deficit is mea-
sured by the negative of the responses of current account. To do so, the simulated
responses are constructed recursively for j = 0, 1, . . . , 20 from equations (35)–(39)
and the notion that R(b+f),0 = 0, since the nonhuman wealth is a predetermined
variable.
Step 4. Steps 1 to 3 are repeated for several calibrated values of p, pi11, and pi13.
In particular, the birth rate is set to approach the cases where the economy is
populated by an infinitely-lived representative consumer (p = 0.001 ≈ 0) and by
a sequence of one-period cohorts (p = 0.999 ≈ 1). Also, the degree of persistence
is fixed to capture oscillating (pi11 = −0.5), smooth (pi11 = 0.5), and nonpersistent
(pi11 = 0.01) dynamics. Finally, the last parameter is calibrated to take into account
the presence (pi13 = −0.5 and pi13 = 0.5) and absence (pi13 = 0.01 ≈ 0) of agents’
superior information.
Figure 3 displays the simulated responses of external deficit for the different
calibrations. These responses exhibit three properties. First, the impact and dy-
namic responses are systematically larger when the birth rate is larger, for given
degrees of persistence and agents’ superior information. This arises because an in-
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crease in the birth rate implies that the tax burden can be more easily shifted to
future generations. In this context, consumers perceive an increase in their cash
flows, so that private consumption and external deficit augment. Also, the impact
responses always converge to unity when the birth rate tends to one. This occurs
because a sequence of static economies implies that the tax burden is completely
shifted to future generations [i.e. (η − r)/η → 1]. Conversely, the impact responses
always equal zero when the birth rate is null. This is because consumers currently
alive reimburse the budget deficit entirely [i.e. (η − r)/η = 0].
Second, the dynamic responses are always larger when the persistence pa-
rameter is larger, for given birth rate and degree of agents’ superior information.
This occurs because a smooth persistence implies that an increase of the contempo-
raneous budget deficit signals future rises of this variable, or synonymously, future
tax reductions. In this case, consumers expect significant increases in their future
cash flow, such that consumption and external deficit increase. To gauge the im-
portance of this notion, it is useful to compare the dynamic responses for the cases
where pi11 = 0.01 and pi11 = 0.50. In the absence of persistence (pi11 = 0.01), the
dynamic responses are flat and correspond to the value of the birth rate. In the
presence of smooth persistence (pi11 = 0.50), the dynamic responses sharply increase
to reach a value that substantially exceeds that of the birth rate. More precisely, the
responses are twice that of the birth rate, within six quarters after the fiscal policy.
For example, for a birth rate equal to one, the external deficit rapidly increases by
two currency units following an additional currency unit of budget deficit due to a
tax-cut.
Finally, the responses do not seem to be affected by the degree of agents’
superior information. That is, the responses are insensitive to changes in the value
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of pi13, for given values of p and pi11.
5.2 Estimates of the Responses
To estimate the empirical responses for each country, the following procedure
is performed.
Step 1. The variables Zˆt and ( ̂Bt+1 + Ft+1) are computed by using equations (17)
and (19), the observations for Zt, Dt, Qt, and (Bt + Ft), as well as the calibration
r = 0.01 (per quarter) and a given value of birth rate p.
Step 2. The unrestricted VARs for adjusted current account and nonhuman wealth
(24) are estimated by OLS. These processes are used to construct the restricted
VARs for adjusted current account (27) and nonhuman wealth (28).
Step 3. The empirical impact and dynamic responses of external deficit are mea-
sured by the negative of the responses of current account (35). The empirical
impact and dynamic responses of budget deficit are given by (39). These empir-
ical responses are constructed recursively for j = 0, 1, . . . , 20 from (35)–(39) and
R(b+f),0 = 0.
Step 4. Steps 1 to 3 are performed for the GMM estimates of the birth rate, pˆ,
as well as the smallest values, p
¯
, and largest values, p¯, for which the orthogonality
conditions are not rejected at the 1 percent level of significance.
Figure 4 exhibits the empirical responses of external and budget deficits.
Figure 5 presents the probability values that the responses of external deficit are
equal to zero, one, and the birth rate. Recall that the impact responses are null and
unity when the birth rates are equal to zero and one. Also, the dynamic responses
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correspond to the value of the birth rate when there is no persistence.
Empirically, the responses of budget deficit are always numerically close to
one and statistically significant. [For briefness, this last result is not reported.]
This reveals that fiscal policies persistently affect the budget deficit. In addition,
as explained above, the persistence of the budget deficit can lead to a substantial
increase of the external deficit, so that the associated dynamic responses exceed the
value of the birth rate.
In general, the responses of external deficit are numerically positive. Ex-
ceptions are Japan for the first five quarters after the shock when p = p
¯
, and at
impact when p = p¯ and p = pˆ; the United Kingdom for the first 13 and 15 quarters
when p = p
¯
and p = pˆ; and the United States for the second quarter when p = p
¯
and the first eight quarters when p = pˆ. Moreover, the responses are most of the
time insignificantly different from zero (at the 10 percent level) when p = p
¯
and
p = pˆ, but are often statistically positive when p = p¯. Exceptions are France and
Italy where the responses are statistically positive after one quarter when p = p
¯
;
Germany and Japan where the responses are significantly larger than zero after 14
and seven quarters when p = pˆ; as well as Italy and the United States where the
responses are never significant when p = p¯. Overall, these findings suggest that
fiscal policies influence the external deficit, as long as p = p¯. This is rationalized
by the property stating that the responses increase as the birth rate increases, and
the fact that p¯ is always larger than p
¯
and pˆ.
The responses of external deficit are frequently numerically smaller than
unity. Exceptions are Canada for the responses at impact when p = p¯ and p = pˆ;
Germany for the first quarter when p = p¯; and Japan after 17 quarters when p = p¯.
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Furthermore, the responses are systematically signifcantly different from one (at
the 10 percent level) when p = p
¯
, and are frequently statistically smaller than unity
when p = p¯ and p = pˆ. Important exceptions are Canada and Japan where the
responses are never significantly different from one when p = p¯ and p = pˆ; and
the United States where the responses are always statistically equal to unity when
p = p¯. Thus, Canada, Japan, and the United States are the countries for which
fiscal policies most strongly alter the external deficit, especially when p = p¯. Again,
this finding is explained by the concept that the responses are larger when the birth
rate is larger, and the evidence that p¯ is the largest estimate of the birth rate.
Finally, the responses of external deficit are numerically larger than the birth
rate. Exceptions are Japan for the first six and two quarters after the shock when
p = p
¯
and p = p¯, and at impact when p = pˆ; the United Kingdom for the first 14
and 16 quarters when p = p
¯
and p = pˆ; and the United States for the second quarter
when p = p
¯
and the first nine quarters when p = pˆ. In addition, the responses are
most of the time insignificantly different from the value of the birth rate (at the 10
percent level) when p = p
¯
and p = pˆ, but are often statistically larger when p = p¯.
Exceptions are France and Italy where the responses are statistically larger than
the birth rate after five and one quarters when p = p
¯
; Germany and Japan where
the responses are significantly larger than the birth rate after 15 and 10 quarters
when p = pˆ; as well as Italy and the United States where the responses are never
significantly different from the birth rate when p = p¯. As shown above, the property
that the responses are larger than the birth rate is due to the great persistence of
the forcing variables, and in particular, the budget deficit.
In summary, fiscal policies subtantially and persistently affect the budget
deficits of all countries. These policies are also likely to greatly influence the external
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deficits for Canada, Japan, and the United States. In particular, the effects of a
tax-cut are enhanced by the large degree of persistence of the budget deficits for
Canada and Japan. In contrast, a tax-cut has smaller impacts on the external
deficits for France and Germany, mild influences for the United Kingdom, and only
negligible effects for Italy.
6. Conclusion
This paper studied the effects of fiscal policies on external and budget deficits.
To do so, it improves on previous analyses in two crucial dimensions. First, it
enlarges the analysis by studying the G7 countries to have a broad international
perspective of the effects of fiscal policies on external and budget deficits. Second,
it evaluates both impact and dynamic responses to provide a complete assessment
of the temporal effects of a tax-cut.
Our analysis is performed on quarterly series for the G7 countries over the
post-1975 period. It is shown that the time-series properties of the current account,
budget deficit, net output, and nonhuman wealth support the case where the birth
rate is strictly positive. Interestingly, the estimates confirm that the birth rate is
always strictly positive, but numerically small. Finally, the responses of external
and budget deficits are substantial and persistent for most countries. In particular,
the fiscal policy has the most important effects on the external deficits for Canada,
Japan, and the United States; somewhat smaller impacts for France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom; and negligible effects for Italy.
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Table 1. Tests of Unit Root: Levels
Countries Tests Variables
Zt Dt Qt (Bt + Ft)
Canada DF −1.206n −2.711t −3.168t −2.622t
PP −1.859n −2.781t 3.653n −2.584t
France DF −2.158t −3.265t −1.685t −2.127t
PP −3.065t −9.429t,a −2.387t −2.150t
Germany DF −1.626n −4.059c,a −1.867t −2.173t
PP −2.179n,b −8.059c,a −2.598t −2.917t
Italy DF −1.681n −2.461c −4.584t,a −2.584t
PP −2.259n,b −2.461c −4.406t,a −2.491t
Japan DF −3.270t −0.295t 2.084t −9.108t,a
PP −2.035c −0.498t −2.027c −9.328t,a
UK DF −1.330n −3.283c,b 1.154c −4.051t,a
PP −3.353t −4.096c,a −1.721t −2.968c,b
US DF −3.281t −1.004n 7.715n −2.481t
PP 0.024n −6.181t,a 6.341n 0.843n
Note: Entries are the t-statistics of the coefficients associated with the lagged values of
the variables. The superscrits are x, y. x = n, c, and t when the regression includes no
deterministic term, a constant, and a constant as well as a linear trend. y = a and b when
the coefficients are significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels. MacKinnon asymptotic critical
values at the 1 and 5 percent levels are −2.56 and −1.94 for x = n; −3.43 and −2.86 for
x = c; and −3.96 and −3.41 for x = t.
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Table 2. Tests of Unit Root: First Differences
Countries Tests Variables
∆Zt ∆Dt ∆Qt ∆(Bt + Ft)
Canada DF −6.317n,a −6.361n,a −7.315c,a −2.622c
PP −12.736n,a −10.946n,a −7.012n,a −10.219n,a
France DF −15.677n,a −16.155n,a −10.584c,a −10.207n,a
PP −16.044n,a −32.509n,a −13.489c,a −10.194n,a
Germany DF −12.710n,a −11.776n,a −4.600c,a −3.058n,a
PP −12.710n,a −31.582n,a −14.589c,a −13.852n,a
Italy DF −13.995n,a −6.566n,a −5.839c,a −7.234c,a
PP −13.850n,a −10.828n,a −15.728c,a −10.134c,a
Japan DF −3.528n,a −6.200t,a −10.252t,a −5.617t,a
PP −11.862n,a −5.570n,a −14.438t,a −35.156n,a
UK DF −9.967n,a −4.200n,a −11.393c,a −5.952n,a
PP −14.118n,a −17.729n,a −11.453c,a −5.965n,a
US DF −11.060n,a −14.229n,a −9.048c,a −2.366n,b
PP −11.076n,a −24.169n,a −9.205c,a −7.922n,a
Note: Entries are the t-statistics of the coefficients associated with the lagged values of the
variables. ∆ represents the first difference operator. The superscrits are x, y. x = n, c, and
t when the regression includes no deterministic term, a constant, and a constant as well
as a linear trend. y = a and b when the coefficients are significant at the 1 and 5 percent
levels. MacKinnon asymptotic critical values at the 1 and 5 percent levels are −2.56 and
−1.94 for x = n; −3.43 and −2.86 for x = c; and −3.96 and −3.41 for x = t.
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Table 3. Tests of Cointegration
Countries Tests Levels of Significance
1 5
Canada Tr 0 1
ME 0 0
France Tr 1 2
ME 1 2
Germany Tr 1 1
ME 1 1
Italy Tr 1 2
ME 1 2
Japan Tr 1 2
ME 2 2
UK Tr 2 0
ME 0 0
US Tr 3 3
ME 3 3
Note: Entries are the number of cointegration relations at the 1 and 5 percent levels of
significance.
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Table 4. Estimates of Birth Rate
Countries Levels of significance p
¯
p¯ pˆ
1 0.001 0.032 0.004
Canada 5 0.003 0.021 (0.008)
10 0.006 0.015 [0.142]
1 0.008 0.017 0.003
France 5 — — (0.003)
10 — — [0.008]
1 0.001 0.010 0.006b
Germany 5 0.003 0.016 (0.003)
10 0.004 0.031 [0.260]
1 0.001 0.005 0.004
Italy 5 0.001 0.001 (0.003)
10 — — [0.684]
1 0.001 0.037 0.026a
Japan 5 0.003 0.022 (0.010)
10 — — [0.037]
1 0.001 0.036 0.002
UK 5 0.001 0.021 (0.002)
10 0.001 0.014 [0.519]
1 0.001 0.016 0.002
US 5 0.001 0.008 (0.003)
10 0.001 0.003 [0.056]
Note: Entries are the estimates of the birth rate. p
¯
and p¯ are the smallest and largest
values of the birth rate for which the orthogonality restrictions are not rejected at the 1,
5, and 10 percent levels of significance. pˆ represents the GMM estimates of the birth rate.
The superscrits a and b indicate that the GMM estimates are significant at the 1 and 5
percent levels. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the GMM estimates.
Entries in brackets are the probability values associated with the J-test of overidentification
restrictions.
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Table 5. Tests of Granger-Causality
Countries Variables p
¯
p¯ pˆ
Canada ∆Qt 0.723 0.417 0.511
∆Dt 0.709 0.713 0.729
France ∆Qt 0.813 0.769 0.948
∆Dt 0.997 0.977 0.991
Germany ∆Qt 0.092 0.796 0.756
∆Dt 0.336 0.438 0.337
Italy ∆Qt 0.691 0.909 0.953
∆Dt 0.181 0.621 0.565
Japan ∆Qt 0.323 0.071 0.065
∆Dt 0.587 0.629 0.546
UK ∆Qt 0.044 0.002 0.009
∆Dt 0.449 0.450 0.401
US ∆Qt 0.113 0.953 0.079
∆Dt 0.517 0.745 0.546
Note: Entries are the probability values associated with the test that the lagged adjusted
current account does not affect the current variables. p
¯
and p¯ are the smallest and largest
values of the birth rate for which the orthogonality restrictions are not rejected at the 1
percent level of significance, while pˆ corresponds to the GMM estimates of the birth rate.
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Figure 2: Orthogonality Restrictions
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The horizontal lines correspond to the conventional levels of significance.
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Figure 3: Simulated Responses
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The solid (dashed) lines correspond to the simulated responses of external deficit with
p = 0.001 (p = 0.999).
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Figure 4: Empirical Responses
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The solid (dashed) lines correspond to the empirical responses of external (budget) deficits.
48
Figure 5: Probability Values
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The solid (dashed) [dotted] lines correspond to the probability values that the responses
of external deficit are equal to zero (the birth rate) [one].
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